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Abstract  
Previous research suggests impaired metacognitive monitoring and mathematics under-
achievement in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Within educational settings, metacognitive 
monitoring is supported through the provision of feedback, (e.g., with goal reminders and by 
explicitly correcting errors). Given the strength of the relationship between metacognition, learning 
and educational attainment, the current research tested new computer-based metacognitive 
support (the ‘Maths Challenge’) for mathematics leaners with ASD within the context of their 
classroom. The Maths Challenge required learners to engage in metacognitive monitoring before 
and after answering each question (e.g., intentions and judgments of accuracy), and negotiate with 
the system the level of difficulty. Forty secondary school children with ASD and 95 typically 
developing learners completed the Maths Challenge in either a Feedback condition, with 
metacognitive monitoring support regarding the accuracy of their answers, goal reminders and 
strategy support, or with no feedback. Contrary to previous findings ASD learners showed an 
undiminished ability to detect errors. They did, however, demonstrate reduced cohesion between 
their pre- and post-test intentions. Support from the Feedback condition significantly improved task 
performance for both groups. Findings highlight important implications for educational interventions 
regarding the provision of metacognitive support for ASD learners to ameliorate under-performance 
in mathematics within the classroom.  
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Supporting metacognitive monitoring in mathematics learning for young people with autism 
spectrum disorder: A classroom-based study 
 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by impairments in social communication 
and behavioural flexibility and is estimated to affect around 1% of the population (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Baird et al., 2006). These impairments may impact upon learning, and 
recent reports indicate greater gaps in attainment for pupils with ASD compared to their typically 
developing (TD) peers (Keen, Webster & Ridley, 2016; Wilkinson & Twist, 2010), with many 
demonstrating a specific deficit in mathematics (e.g., Chiang & Lin, 2006; Mayes & Calhoun, 2006). 
Despite reports of the existence of a small sub-group of mathematically gifted people with ASD 
(Aagten-Murphy et al., 2015; Chiang & Lin, 2006; Iuculano et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2009; Mayes & 
Calhoun, 2003; 2006), on average, mathematics ability is substantially lower among people with ASD 
than would be expected on the basis of IQ (Aagten-Murphy et al., 2015; Chiang & Lin, 2007; Estes, 
Rivera, Bryan, Cali & Dawson, 2011; Griswold et al., 2002; Mayes & Calhoun, 2003; 2006; see also 
Jones et al., 2009). Educational underachievement in mathematics contributes directly to less-than-
optimal economic outcomes (e.g., low levels of employment) and life chances among people with 
ASD (Estes et al., 2011). 
One of the most effective and cost efficient educational interventions is to support 
metacognition (Higgins et al., 2013). Metacognition can be defined as the ability to reflect upon, 
understand and control one’s learning, or ‘thinking about one’s thinking’ (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). 
It is well established that metacognition facilitates self-regulation of behaviour and learning: 
monitoring when or where mistakes are made means that learning strategies can be modified 
accordingly (e.g., revising until you are confident you know the topic). Within an educational 
context, research has highlighted that metacognition predicts academic achievement more 
powerfully than intellectual abilities (Hartwig, Was, Isaacson & Dunlosky, 2012; Thiede, 1999; 
Veenman, Kok & Blöte, 2005) and there is extensive evidence that developing metacognition is an 
effective intervention in school children within and below the ‘normal’ range of ability (Dunlosky, 
Kubat-Silman & Hertzog, 2003; Iuculano et al., 2014; Maxwell & Grenier, 2014; Schneider & Artelt, 
2010; van der Stel & Veenman, 2010; see also Roebers, Cimeli, Röthlisberger & Neuenschwander, 
2012; Roebers, Krebs & Roderer, 2014). Accordingly, teaching approaches that encourage learners to 
monitor, evaluate and strategize their learning are now widely recommended (Higgins et al., 2013; 
Special Education Support Service, 2009).  
This is pertinent because research indicates that autistic individuals have a metacognitive 
deficit (Bebko & Ricciuti, 2000; Brosnan et al., 2015; Farrant, Blades & Boucher, 1999; Farrant, 
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Boucher & Blades, 1999; Grainger, Williams & Lind, 2014, 2016; McMahan et al., 2016; Vlamings et 
al., 2008; Wojcik, Moulin & Souchay, 2013). For example, children with ASD have specific 
metacognitive difficulties in identifying when they have made mistakes – they report more 
confidence in the accuracy of their answers, even when they are incorrect (Brosnan et al., 2015). 
This is striking because metacognitive monitoring relates to self-regulation of learning (e.g. Isaacson 
& Fujita, 2006) and a deficit in metacognitive monitoring could explain why children with ASD have 
difficulties with self-regulation of learning-related behaviour; not knowing what you know and what 
you do not know, or not knowing if a mistake has been made severely impairs options for 
responding and adapting behaviour accordingly.  
Brosnan et al. (2015) found that, as well as being more likely to think an erroneous answer 
was correct, when told they had made an error learners with ASD were significantly more likely to 
report that they had meant to make that error. This impaired intention monitoring in ASD has also 
been found outside of the educational context in other types of tasks such as knee reflex reactions 
(Williams & Happé, 2010) and matching goals with desirable but unintended outcomes (Phillips, 
Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 1998). Although Brosnan et al. suggested their finding that ASD learners 
reported they meant to get a question wrong was an intention monitoring error, there was no 
assessment of intention prior to answering the mathematics questions. It is possible therefore that 
some learners did in fact intend to get the answer wrong (thus when they report this after the event, 
this was not an intention monitoring error). 
Research with TD children shows that learning can be improved with the provision of 
immediate formative feedback that clarifies goals and minimises uncertainty in relation to how well 
learners are performing on a task, and what strategies they could take to achieve their goals 
(Azevedo & Bernard, 1995; Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik & Morgan, 1991; Shute, 2008). 
Metacognitive self-regulation training in planning, monitoring and control is also successful in 
improving mathematics learning with both TD pupils (Desoete & Veenman, 2006) as well as those 
with learning difficulties (Cornoldi, Lucangeli, Caponi, Falco, Focchiatti & Todeschini, 1995; 
Kroesbergen & Van Luit, 2003). Such training has been shown to be particularly successful when 
combined with cognitive and motivational strategies (Dignath et al., 2008) and when implemented 
via the use of a computer in a cognitive apprenticeship-style learning environment (Teong, 2003; Xin 
& Jitendra, 1999; Zimmerman & Tsikalas, 2005). Although there is some evidence that interventions 
such as reinforcements for successful task completions can support ASD learning (e.g., Adcock & 
Cuvo, 2009; Charlop, Kurtz & Milstein, 1992; Chong & Carrr, 2005; Dunlap & Koegel, 1980), no 
research has specifically targeted support for metacognition and self-regulated learning in ASD. The 
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provision of appropriate metacognitive support for learners with ASD needs to be informed by 
where their difficulties lie specifically with respect to metacognitive monitoring.  
The current research therefore examined: 1) the nature of the metacognitive difficulties in 
ASD with respect to monitoring the accuracy of answers, intentions, and regulating learning strategy 
accordingly; and 2) the use of feedback as metacognitive monitoring support in mathematics 
learners with ASD. Intentions to obtain a correct answer were assessed before as well as after each 
question was attempted. In addition, learners were able to adjust the level of difficulty at various 
points throughout the program. Mathematics performance was explored under two conditions – 
one condition provided metacognitive monitoring support through feedback and one did not. We 
predicted that the provision of metacognitive monitoring support would enhance strategy regulation 
(appropriately adjusting the level of difficulty), and thus mathematics performance (to obtain more 
points) of learners with ASD who have a deficit in metacognitive monitoring.  
Different types of learning environments in and outside classrooms impact upon self-
regulation in learners and research should be sensitive to this context (Boekaerts & Corno, 2005). 
Despite the many benefits of tightly-controlled laboratory-based research, such a paradigm can 
impact upon the participant’s perceived value of the task, and consequently the variables under 
investigation. Within the classroom, intrinsic value is strongly related to use of cognitive strategies 
and self-regulation by typically developing learners. For example, Pintrich and de Groot (1990) 
report that learners who are cognitively engaged and self-regulating are those who are interested in 
and value their classroom academic work. It was therefore felt crucial to examine metacognition and 
self-regulation within the context of the classroom, specifically a typical mathematics lesson, while 
acknowledging that this will limit the extent to which ASD and TD learners can be considered 
matched. Whether and how to match is an ongoing issue in ASD research (e.g., Barbeau, Soulières, 
Dawson, Zeffiro & Mottron, 2013; Jarrold & Brock, 2004). Importantly, the literature above suggests 
that those with ASD will have impaired mathematical ability and metacognition and therefore 
matching on these (for example with a learning disabilities group - who may also have impaired 
language) is problematic. Matching mathematics ability with younger learners can also be 
problematic as the metacognitive factors under investigation do not predict ability until around 11 
years of age (Roebers et al., 2014) and learners with ASD can make types of mathematics errors that 
are not evidenced in TD learners (and vice versa; Brosnan et al., 2015). In an attempt to address 
these issues, the present study’s methodology presented mathematics questions at the appropriate 
level for each student individually in the context of their classroom-based mathematics lesson 
through a computer-based ‘Maths Challenge’ (described below). 
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Method 
Participants and design 
Forty secondary school children (30 male, 10 female) who had received a formal diagnosis of 
autism or Asperger syndrome by a qualified clinician according to DSM (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000, 2013) or ICD criteria (World Health Organisation, 1993) were recruited from 
schools or units specifically for children with ASD. Secondary School in England covers ages 11-16 
where the curriculum is divided between Key Stage 3 (ages 11-14) and Key Stage 4 (ages 15-16). 
Under-achieving children may still be working at Key Stage 2 (for ages 7-11) or even Key Stage 1 (for 
ages 5-7)1. The mean age of the ASD group was 13.33 years (SD = 1.25, range = 11-16 years), and the 
majority were working below the expected level, at Key Stages 1 (n = 10; mean age = 12.70 years) or 
2 (n = 20; mean age = 13.35 years)2, however 4 ASD pupils were working at Key Stage 3 (mean age = 
13.50 years) and 6 were working at Key Stage 4 (mean age = 14.17 years). All children with ASD were 
educated within specialist provision classrooms housed within mainstream schools. Comparison 
participants comprised 95 secondary school pupils (58 male, 37 female) from mainstream schools, 
with a mean age of 13.40 years (SD = 1.15, range = 11-15 years), and all were working at the 
appropriate level, at Key Stages 3 (n = 64, mean age = 12.88 years) and 4 (n = 31, mean age = 14.48 
years). Ethical approval was prospectively obtained from the University of Bath research ethics 
committee.  
It is important to note that the groups did not significantly differ on age, t(133) =.34, p =.74, 
d = .06, or proportion of males to females, χ2 = 2.41 (1, N=135), p = .12, ϕ = .13, and the ASD group 
was under-achieving in mathematics as has widely been reported in the literature (e.g., Aagten-
Murphy et al., 2015; Chiang & Lin, 2007; Estes et al., 2011; Griswold et al., 2002). The samples were 
therefore reflective of the populations from which they were drawn. The focus of the present study 
was not on absolute level of mathematical ability – as the computer program was flexible to start at 
the appropriate level for each student (Key Stage 1 to 4) – but on the influence of feedback on 
metacognition (see Discussion). The study took place within the context of the classroom and 
assessments of mathematical ability were from the classroom teacher and starting level 
mathematics performance on the current task, as formal assessments of mathematical ability were 
not possible within this context. 
                                                          
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-curriculum-in-england-
mathematics-programmes-of-study 
 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by SAGE Publications in Autism, 
available online at https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361317722028. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2017, SAGE Publications. 
A 2 (Group: ASD vs. TD) x 2 (Metacognitive support: Feedback vs. No feedback) between 
participants design was used, whereby participants were randomly assigned to either a ‘Feedback’ 
or a ‘No Feedback’ condition (see below for more details), with the constraint that there were 
approximately the same number of participants in each group x condition cell. The final sample 
comprised 40 ASD participants (21 feedback; 19 no feedback) and 95 TD participants (46 feedback; 
49 no feedback). There was an even distribution in the ratio of males to females in each feedback 
condition for both the ASD (p = .57, ϕ = .03, Fishers exact test) and TD group (χ2 (1, N = 95) = .21, p = 
.65, ϕ = .05), and age was evenly distributed between conditions for both ASD, F(1, 38) = .04, p = .84, 
ηp² = .001, and TD groups, F(1, 93) = .18, p = .67, ηp² = .002. There was an approximately even 
distribution of participants working at the different Key Stages between conditions for both the ASD 
(p =.51, ϕ = .26, Fishers exact test) and the TD group (χ2 (1, N =95) <.001, p >.99, ϕ = <.001) (Table 1). 
Finally, while starting level mathematics performance, in terms of number of correct answers 
provided for the first block of questions (that is, independent from metacognitive ability and 
feedback condition), was significantly lower among ASD participants compared to the TD group, 
F(1,131) = 9.90, p = .002, ηp² =.07, it did not differ between feedback conditions, F(1, 131) = 1.02, p = 
.32, ηp² = .01. A lack of Group x Condition interaction indicated that starting level mathematics did 
not significantly differ between feedback conditions for either group, F(1, 131) = 1.17, p = .28, ηp² = 
.01. Thus, we were confident that age, sex and mathematically ability did not significantly differ 
between the Feedback and No Feedback conditions. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of participants, mean ages and ratio of males to females working between the 
different Key Stages in each condition  
   ASD TD 
  Key 
Stage 
1 
Key 
Stage 
2 
Key 
Stage 
3 
Key 
Stage 
4 
Key 
Stage 
1 
Key 
Stage 
2 
Key 
Stage 
3 
Key 
Stage 
4 
          
Feedback  % (n) 15% 
(6) 
30% 
(12) 
2.5% 
(1) 
5% (2) 0 0 33% 
(31) 
16% 
(15) 
 M age (SD) 
 
12.83 
(.41) 
13.25 
(1.22) 
14.00  
( - ) 
14.50 
(.71) 
  12.84 
(.93) 
14.40 
(.63) 
 N male; 
female 
5; 1 8; 4 1; 0  2; 0    17; 14 10; 5 
          
 
No 
Feedback 
% (n) 10% 
(4) 
20% 
(8) 
7.5% 
(3) 
10% 
(4) 
0 0 35% 
(33) 
17% 
(16) 
M age (SD) 
 
12.50 
(1.29) 
13.50 
(1.93) 
13.33 
(1.15) 
14.00 
(.00) 
  12.91 
(1.01) 
14.56 
(.63) 
N male; 
female 
3; 1 5; 3 2; 1 4; 0   21; 12 10; 6 
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Materials and procedure 
The Maths Challenge. We developed the “Maths Challenge” computer program in Real 
Studio (Xojo, 2011), whereby, to maximise points won, participants needed to monitor their 
performance and adapt their strategy accordingly. The program comprised seven levels of difficulty 
and questions were more difficult the higher the level. Each question answered correctly was worth 
points commensurate to that level (e.g., 3 points per question answered correctly on Level 3), while 
errors were worth 0 points. Participants answered four blocks of three questions. In order to provide 
participants the opportunity to move up or down in level of difficulty from the outset (after 
completing the first block), all participants started the game at Level 4. After completing each block, 
participants decided themselves whether to stay at the same level (with the same points available 
per question), move up a level (with more points available per question) or move down a level for 
the next block (with fewer points available per question) and so forth until they had completed all 
four blocks. Thus, notwithstanding mathematics ability, an individual’s maximum points potential 
was determined by their metacognitive strategy regulation (e.g., if all questions on Level 4 were 
answered incorrectly the most rewarding strategy would be to move down to Level 3 for the next 
block), as well as their ability to judge when errors are made.  
Four versions of the Maths Challenge were developed to accommodate pupils at varying 
levels of mathematical ability in terms of the English Key Stage (KS) level they were currently 
working at. Specifically, Version 1 comprised questions from KS1; Version 2 questions from KS2; 
Version 3 questions from KS3; and Version 4 questions from KS4. Within each version, Levels 1 to 7 
comprised questions from lower to higher KS sub-levels within that respective Key Stage. 
Mathematics questions were selected from UK National Curriculum past test papers and exam 
revision workbooks on the basis that they could be answered mentally, without the need for pen, 
paper or calculator. The program began with general instructions explaining the structure, aims and 
points allocations. Each mathematics question was preceded by a 5-point pre-test intention measure 
(“how hard are you going to try to get the next question right”), and was followed by a 5-point post-
test metacognitive monitoring confidence judgment (“do you think you got that question right or 
wrong”), and finally a 3-point post-test intention measure (“did you mean to get that question right 
or wrong”) (Figure 1). For the purposes of the analyses, the 5-point pre-test measure was collapsed 
into 3 points (1 = try to get wrong; 2 = neutral; 3 = try to get right). A prototype of the program was 
piloted with both ASD and TD children and received positive evaluations, indicating that children 
were motivated to perform well.  
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Figure 1. Order of pre- and post-test intention and metacognitive judgment measures for each 
mathematics question in the Feedback condition. Note that in the No Feedback condition the correct 
answer (the fourth display box) was omitted.  
 
Participants were tested in classroom groups during school lessons; however, each pupil 
completed the program individually at their own computer. In the Feedback condition, participants 
received feedback after each question regarding whether they had answered correctly or not, and 
how many points they had won for that question. This was displayed in the text and also graphically 
with gold coins denoting the points won for that question, as well as a running total of points won 
thus far displayed in a box on the top left corner of the screen. After completing each level, 
Feedback participants also received a summary regarding the number of questions they had 
answered correctly and the number of points won, which was accompanied by a goal reminder that 
their task was to finish the program with as many points as possible. After completing the three 
questions in each level, all participants were asked whether they wanted to move up, down, or stay 
on the same level. In the feedback condition, this was accompanied by strategy reminders; for 
example that choosing to go down a level would mean easier questions, but fewer points available 
for each question. To examine metacognitive monitoring (of mathematics accuracy) and strategy 
regulation (level decisions that optimise correct answers and points won) in the absence of external 
q I’m going to try really hard to get it right
q I’m going to try to get it right
q I’m not going to try very hard
q I’m going to try to get it wrong
q I’m going to try really hard to get it wrong
Pre-test	inten on		
Maths	ques on	
Metacogni ve		
Judgement		
Feedback	
Post-test	inten on		
		
		
q I’m	sure	I	got	it	right	
q I	think	I	got	it	right	
q I’m	not	sure	
q I	think	I	got	it	wrong	
q I’m	sure	I	got	it	wrong	 		
		
		
q I	meant	to	get	it	right	
q I’m	not	sure	
q I	meant	to	get	it	wrong	
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support, the No Feedback condition provided no indication of whether questions had been 
answered correctly or not, and information regarding points won and goal/strategy reminders were 
omitted from the display (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Provision of feedback, goal reminders and metacognitive strategy support prior to level 
decisions in the Feedback condition (panel A). In the No Feedback condition participants were simply 
asked to make a level decision (panel B).  
 
 
Finally, participants completed a brief metacognitive questionnaire, comprising four 
questions (each answered on a 4-point scale) reflecting on their metacognitive performance, 
specifically: awareness of performance (from ‘never or rarely aware’ to ‘always aware’); points plan 
(from ‘no plan’ to ‘get as many points as possible’); level strategy (from ‘stayed on the same level 
regardless of difficulty’ to ‘if easy then up; if difficult then down a level’); checking of answers (from 
‘never or rarely checked’ to ‘always checked answers’).  
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Results 
 
Analysis overview 
We report the results of analyses conducted to test the nature of the metacognitive 
difficulties in ASD (and whether experimental task performance differed between groups and 
feedback conditions) with respect to the following metacognitive variables: Judgments of confidence 
for correct and incorrect answers; pre- and post-question intention monitoring; and self-reported 
metacognition ratings. Finally, we report the effect of feedback in terms of the number of correct 
answers in the first and final blocks. Table 2 provides a summary of the means and SDs of each of 
these variables between groups and conditions.  
 
Table 2. Mean scores across all task variables (standard deviations are in parentheses) 
 
 ASD TD 
 No Feedback Feedback No Feedback Feedback 
Judgements of confidence in answers 
(range = 0-1) 
.69 (.22) .76 (.25) .70 (.17) .67 (.25) 
Mean pre-test question intentions 
(range = 1-3) 
2.88 (.35) 3.00 (.02) 2.90 (.30) 2.74 (.54) 
Mean post-test intentions (range = 1-
3) 
2.51 (.66) 2.49 (.59) 2.71 (.52) 2.36 (.70) 
Self-reported metacognition score 
(range = 0-12) 
4.53 (3.49) 3.38 (3.17) 4.55 (2.37) 4.13 (3.57) 
Starting level Mathematics 
performance (number of points won 
on first block) (range = 0-12) 
5.26 (4.43) 6.86 (4.76) 8.49 (3.80) 8.43 (3.79) 
Final level Mathematics performance 
(number of points won on final block 
(range = 0-21) 
3.21 (5.13) 7.67 (6.69) 6.29 (5.73) 7.30 (5.27) 
 
 
Judgments of confidence  
Participants’ ordinal metacognitive judgment ratings of their accuracy to each question on a 
5-point confidence scale (‘I’m sure I got it right’; ‘I think I got it right’; ‘I don't know’; ‘I think I got it 
wrong’; ‘I’m sure I got it wrong’) were translated question-by-question into interval data (1, 0.75, 
0.5, 0.25, 0) for the analyses.  
 To determine whether participants assigned higher confidence to correct compared to 
incorrect answers, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition: Feedback vs. No Feedback) x 2 (Answer: correct vs. 
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incorrect) mixed-ANOVA was conducted, where Answer was the within-participants factor3. There 
was a main effect of Group, F(1, 120) = 4.15, p = .04, ηp² = .03, whereby the ASD group were 
significantly more confident generally that their answers were correct (M = .73, SD = .23) than were 
the TD group (M = .68, SD = .21). There was also a significant main effect of Answer, F(1, 120) = 
87.34, p < .001, ηp² = .42, whereby confidence was significantly higher for correct answers (M = .80, 
SD = .18) than for incorrect answers (M = .56, SD = .27). There was no effect of Condition, F(1, 120) = 
.11, p = .74, ηp² = .001, Group x Condition interaction, F(1, 120) = 2.69, p = .11, ηp² =.02, or Group x 
Condition x Answer interaction, F(1, 120) = 1.60, p = .21, ηp² =.01, indicating that the provision of 
feedback did not affect the nature of metacognitive judgements among either group. Finally, the 
Group x Answer interaction was not significant, F(1, 120) = .59, p = .45, ηp² = .005, indicating that 
both groups showed higher confidence for correct than incorrect answers (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean confidence in correct and incorrect answers by ASD and TD participants (error bars 
indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the mean) 
 
 
Intention monitoring 
Pre-test intentions. A 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) between participants ANOVA revealed no 
significant main effects of Group, F(1, 131) = 1.82, p = .18, ηp² = .01, or Condition, F(1, 131) = 1.23, p 
= .27, ηp² = .01. The Group x Condition interaction for pre-test intentions was also not significant, 
F(1, 131) = .57, p = .45, ηp² = .004.  
                                                          
3 Four TD participants and two ASD participants did not produce any correct answers, and four ASD 
participants did not produce any incorrect answers. These participants were excluded from the analysis. 
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Post-test intentions. A 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) between participants ANOVA revealed no 
significant main effects of Group, F(1, 131) = .06, p = .80, ηp² < .01, or Condition, F(1, 131) = 2.56, p = 
.11, ηp² = .02. The Group x Condition interaction for pre-test intentions was also not significant, F(1, 
131) = 2.06, p = .15, ηp² = .02.  
Predicting post-test intentions from pre-test intentions. Pre- and post-test intentions were 
significantly positively correlated for both ASD, r = .64, p < .001, and TD groups, r = .81, p < .001. To 
examine whether the strength of the association between pre- and post-test intentions was similar 
for both groups, Fisher’s Z transformations were conducted. These indicated a significantly weaker 
association between pre- and post-test intentions for the ASD group compared to the TD group, Zr1 – 
r2 = 1.89, p = .03. Figure 4 displays average post-test intentions (from 1 = ‘I meant to get it wrong’ to 
3 ‘I meant to get it right’) for each pre-test intention option (from 1 = ‘I’m going to try to get it 
wrong’ to 3 = ‘I’m going to try to get it right’) for errors made by ASD and TD groups. The TD group 
showed better calibration (with scores closer to the dotted line) than the ASD group. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Pre- and post-test intentions for errors. The dotted line indicates perfect calibration.  
 
Metacognitive questionnaire  
A 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) MANOVA was conducted with participants’ four self-reported 
metacognitive ratings (awareness of performance; points plan; level strategy and checking of 
answers) as dependant variables. There was no multivariate effect of Group, F(4, 128) = 1.63, p = .17, 
ηp² = .05, or Condition, F(4, 128) = 2.13, p = .08, ηp² = .06, and the Group x Condition interaction was 
also not significant, F(4, 128) = .61, p = .66, ηp² = .02.  
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Mathematics performance: Effect of feedback 
Groups significantly differed on starting level mathematics, as described above and 
evidenced by significantly fewer points won by the ASD group on the first block of questions, F(1, 
131) =9.90, p =.002, ηp² = .07, with no main effect of Condition or Group x Condition interaction at 
the start of the task (ps >.28). To examine whether feedback was effective in improving self-
regulation, as measured by optimal strategy use to win as many points as possible, a 2 (Group) x 2 
(Condition) between participants ANOVA was conducted for points won on the final block4. There 
was a significant effect of Condition, F(1, 131) = 6.57, p = .01, ηp² = .05, whereby more points were 
won in the Feedback (M = 7.42, SD = 5.71) compared to the No Feedback condition (M = 5.43, SD = 
5.70) but no significant main effect of Group, F(1, 131) = 1.61, p = .21, ηp² = .01 or Group x Condition 
interaction, F(1, 131) = 2.59, p = .11, ηp² = .02. Thus, the provision of feedback improved 
performance for both groups (Figure 5).  
 
  
 
Figure 5. Number of points won on the final block in the Maths Challenge as a function of Group and 
Feedback condition (error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the mean) 
 
                                                          
4 Since ASD and TD groups differed on starting level mathematics performance (and thus the number of points 
won at the start of the game), strategy would be expected to have its largest effect on points won on the final 
block. 
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Discussion 
 
‘Metacognition’, or awareness of one’s cognition, makes a major contribution to the 
learning of mathematics and is a better predictor of educational achievement (e.g., exam 
performance) than assessments of intelligence. Self-regulated learning requires setting one’s own 
goals in relation to learning and ensuring that they are attained (Efklides, 2011). Effectively 
regulating learning, for example through study time allocation and revision methods, is dependent 
on the ability to monitor what and how much material is known, as well as one’s goals and 
intentions (Metcalfe, 2009; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Despite the metacognitive difficulties and 
educational under attainment experienced by people with ASD, no research has specifically targeted 
support for metacognition and self-regulated learning in ASD. The context of self-regulated learning 
has been argued to be crucial, requiring research to be as context-sensitive as possible (e.g., 
Boekaerts & Corno, 2005); thus, the aim of the current research was to test appropriate 
metacognitive support for ASD mathematics learners within the context of their mathematics 
lessons.  
The present findings indicate that ASD leaners can successfully distinguish correct from 
incorrect answers. This is contrary to previous reports that autistic children show diminished 
metacognitive monitoring, reporting more confidence in their answers, even when they are 
incorrect (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2015; Grainger et al., 2016; McMahon et al., 2016; Williams, 
Bergström & Grainger, 2017). Findings from the current study indicate that while individuals with 
ASD showed a general bias toward higher confidence, they were still able to differentiate correct 
from incorrect answers. A potential explanation for the current diverging findings could lie with the 
types of tasks used, with the present study adopting a non-socially delivered task in the classroom 
context with elements from serious gaming, which together may have increased ASD learners’ 
understanding, engagement and intrinsic motivation in the task (see Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony & 
Wallace, 2008; White, Burgess & Hill, 2009; Whyte, Smyth & Schef, 2015).  
While monitoring the accuracy of their answers appeared undiminished, learners with ASD 
nevertheless showed reduced cohesion between their pre- and post-test intentions. Including a 
measure of pre-test intentions enabled the present study to extend previous findings by Brosnan et 
al. (2015) to confirm that errors made on mathematics questions were not intended, and therefore 
that post-hoc reporting that errors had been intended more likely reflects diminished intention 
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monitoring. This is important as a diminished sense of one’s intentions towards a task could have a 
significant impact on one’s capacity to benefit from the experience of attempting the task. 
Interestingly there were no differences in the absolute assessments of pre- and post- intentions to 
answer questions correctly; the group difference emerged in the relationship between pre- and 
post- intentions, thus indicating a more subtle impairment in monitoring one’s own intentions in 
ASD. 
Learners with ASD benefited from metacognitive support, as evidenced by their better 
performance in the Feedback compared to the No Feedback condition. Although the Group x 
Condition interaction did not reach statistical significance, this feedback support appeared to be less 
effective for the TD group (Figure 5); however these young people did not have a metacognitive 
deficit. The error bars in Figure 5 highlight the variability in performance and the need for caution in 
interpreting the data, but with no feedback the ASD group average around half the number of points 
of the TD group and slightly more points than the TD group with the provision of feedback. The 
provision of feedback, goal and strategy support may be most effective for learners who have 
difficulties in metacognitive monitoring.  
Higgins et al. (2013) report that supporting metacognition is a fast, efficient and low cost 
method for supporting learning. Consistent with this, the present research suggests that for learners 
with diminished metacognitive monitoring, metacognitive support should: (i) affirm the goal (e.g., to 
get the answer correct); (ii) feedback immediately (e.g., whether the answer was correct/incorrect); 
and (iii) reflect on the goal (e.g., intention monitoring). A limitation of the present study is that it was 
not possible to disentangle the relative benefits of each of these components of metacognitive 
support provided by the feedback condition. This is especially pertinent in the context of the present 
findings of an intention monitoring deficit alongside undiminished accuracy monitoring. For 
example, it is unclear whether the provision of feedback about performance was a necessary 
component in supporting task performance, or whether goal reminders alone would be sufficient. 
Moreover, although successful performance on the Maths Challenge was dependent on strategy 
regulation (to win as many points as possible), the present study did not extricate where group 
differences lay in metacognitive strategy regulation. Further analysis of participants’ self-selecting of 
difficulty level, for example, may reveal differences between the two groups. If learners with ASD are 
also poorer at judging when to best shift difficulty levels, despite when feedback is provided, 
implementing Dynamic Difficulty Adjustment (DDA) (Hunicke, 2005), where game difficulty is 
modified automatically in response to students’ answers, may be beneficial. Anderson (2012) 
proposed developing a framework of conceptual knowledge for the teaching of fractions in a Digital 
Educational Game, where the game keeps track of players’ knowledge and adapts the difficulty level 
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accordingly. Future work may investigate differences in performance between self-selecting 
difficulty and DDA, and whether this can further support metacognition in ASD. Finally, the level of 
challenge in the current study was individualised, which may be significant in the efficacy of support 
(e.g., not too easy/hard). Future research should tease apart these aspects in order to more 
specifically target where support is needed in terms of metacognitive monitoring, intentions and 
self-regulation respectively. 
 These steps to support learning would be expected to extend to all learners with deficits in 
metacognitive monitoring, not just those with ASD, although this needs to be assessed empirically. 
There may be other reasons underpinning poor mathematical performance, such as developmental 
dyscalculia, which is thought to be a deficit in a basic capacity for understanding numerosity (e.g., 
Butterworth, 2004). People with ASD may also have additional deficits in numerosity (e.g., Aagten-
Murphy et al., 2015), which one would not expect to be ameliorated though interventions 
addressing metacognition. The ASD group were mostly working at a Key Stage level below where 
they were expected to be working (the TD group were not). Thus, whilst the ASD group were found 
to benefit from feedback, this does not necessitate that they were consequently at the same 
academic level as the control group. Future research could assess both mathematical skills and 
metacognitive skills to establish any interrelationships. We would expect that supporting 
metacognitive monitoring would be the first step in addressing numerosity deficits. It is worth 
reiterating, however, that whilst people with ASD typically show a specific impairment in 
mathematical ability incommensurate with their IQ, there is also a small group of mathematically 
gifted people with ASD (Aagten-Murphy et al., 2015; Chiang & Lin, 2006; Iuculano et al., 2014; Jones 
et al., 2009; Mayes & Calhoun, 2003; 2006). The present finding may not extend to such a group, and 
it would be interesting to identify how metacognition and numerosity skills differentiated this 
mathematically gifted sub group from the typical ASD profile. 
Metacognitive monitoring is considered essential for a sense of ‘self-concept’ (Roebers et al., 
2012) and for day-to-day behavioural functioning, because accurate monitoring of one’s internal 
states facilitates the regulation of and control over those states, and over learning and behaviour 
(Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). We have used the term metacognitive monitoring to encompass 
assessments of intention before and after each task, and accuracy, as well as the capacity to control 
appropriate cognitive responses to these assessments. This process has been distinguished from 
metacognitive knowledge of cognition, which is the stored acquired knowledge of cognition (e.g. ‘I 
am better at arithmetic than I am at spelling’; Flavell, 1979; Lockl & Schneider, 2002; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Despite differences between groups in intention 
monitoring, there were no self-reported differences on the metacognition questionnaire. If we 
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assume that the intervention did effectively target metacognitive monitoring, it may be that those 
with ASD are unable to self-report their own metacognition. This is consistent with Williams and 
Happé (2010) who argue that a metacognitive understanding of one’s own mind may be more 
impaired in ASD than the metacognitive understanding of other people’s minds. Indeed, Grainger et 
al. (2014) report that despite behaviourally demonstrating impaired metacognition (compared to 
controls), people with ASD self-reported higher levels of metacognition.  
It is a limitation of the present study that that we did not undertake an independent 
assessment of autism diagnosis. Working within the schools, this was not feasible. We used a 
convenience sample within the school environment, which resulted in a male dominated sample 
consistent with the reported male domination of those who receive a diagnosis (for example, our 
ratio of 3:1 is close to Baird et al. (2006) who report 3.3:1). The matching of ASD and TD groups on 
cognitive ability in such a novel study was also not ideal as mathematical ability level was derived 
from teacher report and not formal independent testing (again within the classroom context, 
additional assessments were not feasible). With suboptimal matching we cannot discount the 
possibility that group differences in metacognitive ability were the result of general cognitive 
differences rather than diagnostic group membership per se. Independent assessments of both 
autism diagnosis and mathematical abilities would enable a more fine-grained analysis which would 
be useful additions to future research. However, when examining the relationship between 
metacognition and mathematics performance, the present study’s focus upon being context-specific 
to the classroom may prove crucial.  
To conclude, the present study reports a novel investigation of the impact of metacognitive 
support on autistic children’s mathematics performance – the results of which have the potential to 
make a significant impact on autism education. It is now widely recognised that there is a vital need 
for evidence-based guidance to enable improvements in educational provision for pupils with ASD 
(e.g., Charman, et al., 2011; Keen et al., 2016; Wilkinson & Twist, 2010). An existing body of research 
indicates a metacognitive deficit in ASD, coupled with underachievement in mathematics that is in 
disaccord with intellectual ability. The present findings add to this and indicate that support for 
metacognitive assessments of accuracy and post-test intention monitoring may be particularly 
crucial targets for supporting learners with ASD in mathematics, with the potential to remove widely 
reported under achievement in mathematics.  
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by SAGE Publications in Autism, 
available online at https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361317722028. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2017, SAGE Publications. 
References 
Aagten-Murphy, D., Attucci, C., Daniel, N., Klaric, E., Burr, D., & Pellicano, E. (2015). Numerical 
Estimation in Children With Autism. Autism Research, 8, 668–81. doi:10.1002/aur.1482 
Adcock, J., & Cuvo, A. J. (2009). Enhancing learning for children with autism spectrum disorders in 
regular education by instructional modifications. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 3, 
319–328. doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2008.07.004 
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th 
ed.). Washington, DC: Author 
Andersen, E. (2012). Optimizing adaptivity in educational games. In M. S. El-Nasr, M. Consalvo & S. 
Feiner (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Conference on the Foundations of Digital 
Games (pp. 279-281). New York, NY: ACM. doi:10.1145/2282338.2282398 
Azevedo, R., & Bernard, R. M. (1995). A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Feedback in Computer-Based 
Instruction. Journal of Educational Computing Research, 13, 111–127. doi:10.2190/9LMD-
3U28-3A0G-FTQT 
Baird, G., Simonoff, E., Pickles, A., Chandler, S., Loucas, T., Meldrum, D., & Charman, T. (2006). 
Prevalence of disorders of the autism spectrum in a population cohort of children in South 
Thames: the Special Needs and Autism Project (SNAP). Lancet, 368, 210–215. 
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69041-7. 
Bangert-Drowns, R. L., Kulik, C.-L. C., Kulik, J. A., & Morgan, M. (1991). The Instructional Effect of 
Feedback in Test-Like Events. Review of Educational Research, 61, 213–238. 
doi:10.3102/00346543061002213 
Barbeau, E. B., Soulières, I., Dawson, M., Zeffiro, T. A., & Mottron, L. (2013). The level and nature of 
autistic intelligence III: Inspection time. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 122, 295–301. 
doi:10.1037/a0029984 
Bebko, J. M., & Ricciuti, C. (2000). Executive Functioning and Memory Strategy Use in Children with 
Autism: The Influence of Task Constraints on Spontaneous Rehearsal. Autism, 4, 299–320. 
doi:10.1177/1362361300004003006 
Boekaerts, M. & Corno, L. (2005) Self-Regulation in the Classroom: A Perspective on Assessment and 
Intervention. Applied Psychology, 54, 199–231. doi: 10.1111/j.1464-0597.2005.00205.x 
Brosnan, M., Johnson, H., Grawemeyer, B., Chapman, E., Antoniadou, K., & Hollinworth, M. (2015). 
Deficits in metacognitive monitoring in mathematics assessments in learners with autism 
spectrum disorder. Autism : doi:10.1177/1362361315589477 
Butterworth, B. (2005). The development of arithmetical abilities. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 46, 3–18. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00374.x 
Charlop, M. H., Kurtz, P. F., & Milstein, J. P. (1992). Too much reinforcement, too little behavior: 
assessing task interspersal procedures in conjunction with different reinforcement schedules 
with autistic children. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 25, 795–808. 
doi:10.1901/jaba.1992.25-795 
Charman, T., Pellicano, L., Peacey, L. V., Peacey, N., Forward, K., & Dockrell, J. (2011). Good Practice 
Report: What is Good Practice in Autism Education? London: Autism Education Trust. 
Chiang, H.-M., & Lin, Y.-H. (2007). Mathematical ability of students with Asperger syndrome and 
high-functioning autism: a review of literature. Autism, 11, 547–56. 
doi:10.1177/1362361307083259 
Chong, I. M., & Carr, J. E. (2005). An investigation of the potentially adverse effects of task 
interspersal. Behavioral Interventions, 20, 285–300. doi:10.1002/bin.202 
Cornoldi, C., Lucangeli, D., Caponi, B., Falco, G., Focchiatti, R., & Todeschini, M. (1995). Matematica e 
Metacognizione. Trento: Erickson. 
Desoete, A., & Veenman, M. (2006). Metacognitions in mathematics: Critical issues on nature, 
theory, assessment and treatment. In A. Desoete & M. Veenman (Eds.), Metacognition in 
mathematics education (pp. 1–10). Haupauge, NY: Nova Science.  
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by SAGE Publications in Autism, 
available online at https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361317722028. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2017, SAGE Publications. 
Dignath, C, Buettner,G and Langfeldt. H (2008). How can primary school students learn self-
regulated learning strategies most effectively? A meta-analysis on self-regulation training 
programmes. Educational Research Review, 3, 101-129. doi:10.1016/j.edurev.2008.02.003 
Dunlap, G., & Koegel, R. L. (1980). Motivating autistic children through stimulus variation. Journal of 
Applied Behavior Analysis, 13, 619–27. doi:10.1901/jaba.1980.13-619 
Dunlosky, J., Kubat-Silman, A. K., & Hertzog, C. (2003). Training monitoring skills improves older 
adults' self-paced associative learning. Psychology and Aging, 18(2), 340-345. 
Efklides, A. (2011). Interactions of Metacognition With Motivation and Affect in Self-Regulated 
Learning: The MASRL Model. Educational Psychologist, 46, 6–25. 
doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.538645 
Estes, A., Rivera, V., Bryan, M., Cali, P., & Dawson, G. (2011). Discrepancies between academic 
achievement and intellectual ability in higher-functioning school-aged children with autism 
spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 41(8), 1044-1052. 
Farrant, A., Blades, M., & Boucher, J. (1999). Recall readiness in children with autism. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(5), 359–66.  
Farrant, A., Boucher, J., & Blades, M. (1999). Metamemory in children with autism. Child 
Development, 70(1), 107–31.  
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–
developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911. 
Grainger, C., Williams, D.M. & Lind, S.E. (2016). Metacognitive monitoring and control processes in 
children with autism spectrum disorder: Diminished judgement of confidence accuracy. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 42, 65-74. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.003 
Grainger, C., Williams, D. M., & Lind, S. E. (2014). Metacognition, Metamemory, and Mindreading in 
High-Functioning Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
123, 650–659. doi:10.1037/a0036531 
Griswold, D. E., Barnhill, G. P., Myles, B. S., Hagiwara, T., & Simpson, R. L. (2002). Asperger Syndrome 
and Academic Achievement. Focus on Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities, 17(2), 
94–102. doi:10.1177/10883576020170020401 
Hartwig, M. K., Was, C. A., Isaacson, R. M., & Dunlosky, J. (2012). General knowledge monitoring as a 
predictor of in-class exam performance. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 456–
468. 
Higgins, S., Katsipataki, M., Kokotsaki, D., Coleman, R., Major, L.E., & Coe, R. (2013). The Sutton 
Trust-Education Endowment Foundation Teaching and Learning Toolkit. London: Education 
Endowment Foundation. 
Hunicke, R. (2005). The case for dynamic difficulty adjustment in games. In N. Lee (Ed.), Proceedings 
of the 2005 ACM SIGCHI International Conference on Advances in computer entertainment 
technology (pp. 429-433). New York, NY: ACM. doi:10.1145/1178477.1178573 
Iuculano, T., Rosenberg-Lee, M., Supekar, K., Lynch, C. J., Khouzam, A., Phillips, J., … Menon, V. 
(2014). Brain organization underlying superior mathematical abilities in children with autism. 
Biological Psychiatry, 75, 223–30. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2013.06.018 
Isaacson, R.M. & Fujita, F. (2006). Metacognitive Knowledge Monitoring and Self-Regulated 
Learning: Academic Success and Reflections on Learning. Journal of the Scholarship of 
Teaching and Learning, 39 - 55. doi: 10.1.1.526.6161 
Jarrold, C. & Brock, J. (2004) To match or not to match? Methodological issues in autism-related 
research. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34, 81-86. doi: 
10.1023/B:JADD.0000018078.82542.ab 
Jones, C. R. G., Happé, F., Golden, H., Marsden, A. J. S., Tregay, J., Simonoff, E., … Charman, T. (2009). 
Reading and arithmetic in adolescents with autism spectrum disorders: peaks and dips in 
attainment. Neuropsychology, 23, 718–28. doi:10.1037/a0016360 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by SAGE Publications in Autism, 
available online at https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361317722028. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2017, SAGE Publications. 
Keen, D., Webster, A., & Ridley, G. (2016). How well are children with autism spectrum disorder 
doing academically at school? An overview of the literature. Autism, 20, 276–94. 
doi:10.1177/1362361315580962 
Kenworthy, L., Yerys, B. E., Anthony, L. G., & Wallace, G. L. (2008). Understanding executive control 
in autism spectrum disorders in the lab and in the real world. Neuropsychology Review, 18, 
320–38. doi:10.1007/s11065-008-9077-7  
Kroesbergen, E. H., & Van Luit, J. E. H. (2003). Mathematics intervention for children with special 
educational needs. Remedial and Special Education, 24, 97-114.  
Lockl, K., & Schneider, W. (2007). Knowledge about the mind: links between theory of mind and later 
metamemory. Child Development, 78, 148–67. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.00990.x 
Maxwell, B. R., & Grenier, K. (2014). The Effects of Metacognitive Treatments on the Academic 
Performance of Students with Learning Disabilities: A Meta-Analysis. Canadian Journal for 
New Scholars in Education/ Revue Canadienne Des Jeunes Chercheures En Education. 
Retrieved from 
http://cjnse.journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/ojs2/index.php/cjnse/article/view/285  
Mayes, S. D., & Calhoun, S. L. (2006). Frequency of reading, math, and writing disabilities in children 
with clinical disorders. Learning and Individual Differences, 16, 145–157. 
doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2005.07.004 
Mayes, S. D., & Calhoun, S. L. (2003). Analysis of WISC-III, Stanford-Binet:IV, and academic 
achievement test scores in children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 33, 329–41. doi:10.1023/A:1024462719081 
McMahon, C., Henderson, H., Newell, L. , Jamie, M., & Mundy, P. (2016). Metacognitive awareness 
of facial affect in higher-functioning children and adolescents with autism spectrum 
disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 46, 882-98, doi: 10.1007/s10803-
015-2630-3 
Metcalfe, J. (2009). Metacognitive Judgments and Control of Study. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 18, 159–163. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01628.x 
Nelson, T. O., & Leonesio, R. J. (1988). Allocation of self-paced study time and the “labor-in-vain 
effect”. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14(4), 676–
86.  
Nelson, T. O., and Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: a theoretical framework and new findings. 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141. doi: 10.1016/S0079- 7421(08)60053-5  
Phillips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., & Rutter, M. (1998). Understanding intention in normal development 
and in autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 16, 337–348. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.1998.tb00756.x 
Pintrich, P.R. & de Groot, E.V. (1990) Motivational and self-regulated learning components of 
classroom academic performance. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 33-40. 
doi:10.1037/0022-0663.82.1.33 
Roebers, C. M., Krebs, S. S., & Roderer, T. (2014). Metacognitive monitoring and control in 
elementary school children: Their interrelations and their role for test performance. 
Learning and Individual Differences, 29, 141–149. doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2012.12.003 
Roebers, C. M., Cimeli, P., Röthlisberger, M., & Neuenschwander, R. (2012). Executive functioning, 
metacognition, and self-perceived competence in elementary school children: An 
explorative study on their interrelations and their role for school achievement. 
Metacognition and Learning, 7. doi: 10.1007/s11409-012-9089-9 
Schneider, W., & Artelt, C. (2010). Metacognition and mathematics education. ZDM: The 
International Journal on Mathematics Education, 42, 149–161. doi:10.1007/s11858-010-
0240-2 
Schraw, G. & Dennison, R.S. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary Educational 
Psychology, 19, 460-475.  
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by SAGE Publications in Autism, 
available online at https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361317722028. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2017, SAGE Publications. 
Schraw, G. & Moshman, D. (1995). Metacognitive theories. Educational Psychology Review, 7(4), 
351-371.  
Shute, V. J. (2008). Focus on Formative Feedback. Review of Educational Research, 78, 153–189. 
doi:10.3102/0034654307313795 
Special Education Support Service (SESS). (2009). Metacognition for the classroom and beyond: 
Differentiation and support for learners. Retrieved from 
http://www.sess.ie/sites/all/modules/wysiwyg/tinymce/jscripts/tiny_mce/plugins/filemana
ger/files/Projects/Equality_of_Challenge/SESS_Metacognition_Resource_V1.pdf 
Teong, S. K. (2003). The effect of metacognitive training on mathematical word-problem solving. 
Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 19(1), 46–55. 
Thiede, K. W. (1999). The importance of monitoring and self-regulation during multi-trial learning. 
Psychonomic Bulletin Review, 6, 662–667.  
Van der Stel, M., & Veenman, M. V. J. (2010). Development of metacognitive skillfulness: A 
longitudinal study. Learning and Individual Differences, 20(3), 220–224. 
Veenman, M. V., Kok, R., & Blöte, A. W. (2005). The relation between intellectual and metacognitive 
skills in early adolescence. Instructional Science, 33(3), 193-211. 
Vlamings, P. H. J. M., Jonkman, L. M., Hoeksma, M. R., van Engeland, H., & Kemner, C. (2008). 
Reduced error monitoring in children with autism spectrum disorder: an ERP study. The 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 399–406. doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2008.06336.x 
White, S. J., Burgess, P. W., & Hill, E. L. (2009). Impairments on “open-ended” executive function 
tests in autism. Autism Research, 2, 138–47. doi:10.1002/aur.78  
Whyte, E. M., Smyth, J. M., & Scherf, K. S. (2015). Designing Serious Game Interventions for 
Individuals with Autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 45(12), 3820–3831. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-014-2333-1 
Wilkinson, K. and Twist, L. (2010). Autism and Educational Assessment: UK Policy and Practice. 
Slough: NFER. 
Williams, D. M., Bergström, Z., & Grainger, C. (2016). Metacognitive monitoring and the 
hypercorrection effect in autism and the general population: Relation to autism(-like) traits 
and mindreading. Autism. doi:10.1177/1362361316680178  
Williams, D., & Happé, F. (2010). Representing intentions in self and other: studies of autism and 
typical development. Developmental Science, 13, 307–19. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2009.00885.x 
Wojcik, D. Z., Moulin, C. J. A., & Souchay, C. (2013). Metamemory in children with autism: exploring 
“feeling-of-knowing” in episodic and semantic memory. Neuropsychology, 27, 19–27. 
doi:10.1037/a0030526 
World Health Organization. (1993). The international statistical classification of diseases and related 
mental health problems, tenth revision (ICD-10). Geneva: World Health Organization  
Xojo. (2011). Real Studio (Version 4.3) [Computer software]. Austin, TX: Author. 
Zimmerman, B. J., & Tsikalas, K. E. (2005). Can computer-based learning environments (CBLEs) be 
used as self-regulatory tools to enhance learning? Educational Psychologist, 40(4), 267–271. 
